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Brexit Referendum Campaign and its Impact on the Public Voting Behaviour

A Dissertation Submitted to the Department of English in Partial Fulfilment of the
Requirements for a **Master Degree** in English Language, **Literature and Civilization**.

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Abstract

The present thesis, entitled “*Brexit Referendum Campaign and its Impact on the Public Voting Behaviour*”, explores the concepts of Euroscepticism, nationalism, cosmopolitanism and utilitarianism within the Brexit campaign speeches. These factors as a matter of fact, determined the vote choice in the Brexit referendum in relation to the European integration. The arguments of the Brexit campaign elites as well as the UK’s mass media coverage on the European Union affairs and policies played a significant role in determining the voters’ voting choice in the Brexit referendum. The Leave campaign delivered Eurosceptic narratives on European integration as this can be seen in both Boris Johnson’s speech “*The Liberal Cosmopolitan Case to Vote Leave*” and Nigel Farage’s speech “*Nigel Farage MEP at Grassroots out launch in Kettering*”. In these speeches, Johnson and Farage, focused on disruptive issues such as the loss of Britain’s sovereignty, the threat of immigration on wages, services, and on security. They also emphasized the impact of EU integration and Brexit on UK’s economy. On the contrary, the Remain campaign speeches, like David Cameron speech “*PM speech on the UK’s strength and security in the EU*” and Jeremy Corbyn’s speech “*Europe needs to change but...I am voting to stay*” leaned more to embrace globalization and support remain in the European Union. Our research also examines the issues addressed by the political elites of both Leave and Remain campaigns in their speeches. For this reason, we rely on the expository method to explain the vote choice in the Brexit referendum by identifying and explaining the concepts and factors, which are likely to influence and determine Britain’s Public Voting Behaviour.

Key words: Brexit, British Euroscepticism, National identity, Utilitarianism, Cosmopolitanism, Voting Behaviour.

Dedication

Abdellah Meroul

First of all, I want to thank Allah for helping me throughout all the years of my studies and my life. I want to thank Allah for helping me to achieve this success. Thank you Allah.

To Memory of my Father,

Words are not enough to express my deepest and innermost love for you as the best father in the world. You were the man who I encountered when I was growing up between your hands as a little child. You are the man, strong as the stone and the man of reason. In this dissertation, I'd like to thank you from my deepest heart about every single drop of sweat, which reveals the suffering and difficulties that overwhelmed you so that to see me and our family in good conditions in life. And because the destiny did not give us the chance to see me when I graduate, I dedicate this work to you and someday we will meet inshallah together as we were before in our lifetime like father and son. You will always will be in my heart. Rest in peace Dad.

Your loyal Son: Abdellah.

To my beloved Mother who stood by myside in many difficulties that I faced.

To my sisters who helped me and supported me.

Thank you!

Dedication

Cylia Maibeche

My utmost gratitude goes to God almighty for giving me strength and courage to reach to where I am today.

To my family, my dearest mother and father who sacrificed everything for me.

To my brothers and sisters who stood by me through every step of the way.

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List of Abbreviations

CAP: Common Agricultural Policy.

CFSP: Common Foreign and Security Policies.

DUP: Democratic Unionist Party of Northern Ireland.

ECJ: European Court of Justice.

ECSC: European Coal and Steel Community.

EDC: European Defence Community.

EEC: European Economic Community.

EFTA: European Free Trade Association.

EMS: European monetary System.

EMU: European Monetary Union.

ERM: Exchange Rate Mechanism

ESDP: European Security and Defence Policy

EU: European Union

IGC: Intergovernmental Conference

MP: Member of Parliament.

NHS: National Health and Services.

SEA: Single European Act.

SNP: Scottish National Party.

TFEU: Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union.

UK: United Kingdom.

UKIP: United Kingdom Independent Party.

VAT: Value Added Tax.

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General Introduction

General Introduction

Brexit is defined by the Cambridge Dictionary as a “short term for “ British exit”: an exit by the United Kingdom from the European Union” (“Brexit”). The United Kingdom referendum on European membership poll results revealed the dissatisfaction of the UK public regarding the European integration and its policies. Moreover, Britain will no longer be a member in the Customs Union and the single market. Britain had been largely affected by its integration in the European Union, like the loss of sovereignty, migration crisis, and economic recession .The UK-EU turmoil relationship reached its final peak on 23 June 2016 and the UK hold a referendum on independence from the EU. By a turnout of 72.2 per cent, Britain with a striking majority of 52 percent voted to leave the European Union, whereas 48 percent favoured to remain in the EU (“EU Referendum Results”). The recorded results came as a shock for both UK and EU.

Britain’s opposition to the EU dates back to Britain’s early days of integration in 1973. The UK and EU have long been two separate categories, which are designed by the political dynamics of ambivalence and uncertainty. Britain has a history of being a Eurosceptic member state in Europe. Stephen George described Britain as an ‘Awkward Partner’ of European member states (Kaplan 7). Back in time, Winston Churchill’s sentiments about Europe was that Britain is “with Europe, but not of it” (Hunt). Britons themselves struggle to embrace this European identity. Hence, some of them refer to Europe as “the continent” implying distance and separation. Britain’s sense of place in Europe is that Britain’s integration in the EU was because of ‘rational values’ since Britain has always been skeptical to European projects (Kaplan 7). For example, The Maastricht Treaty (1992) led to split the Conservative Party into pro-Europeans and the nationalist agenda of Eurosceptics who feared supranational elements that was introduced by the Treaty. In addition to this, the UK’s opt-out from the single currency and Schengen area was because of the UK’s reluctance to enter into a deep relationship with

the European integration process (Andreouli 241). Another example is the emergence of hard Eurosceptic groups such as the United Kingdom Independent Party (UKIP), whose clear core reason for existing was to get the UK outside the EU since the early days of the creation of the Party in 1993.

The UKIP became an influential Party, which progressively began to gain popularity and momentum to some extent that started to challenge the Conservative Party in the marginal seats. Therefore, The prime minister and Tory leader, David Cameron, promised an in-out referendum to sustain the enduring issue of the split in the Conservative Party between pro-Europeans and Tory right-wing Eurosceptic group in relation to European integration, and to prevent any opposition from UKIP that threatens the Conservative Party to win in the 2015 election. David Cameron was confident that his country would stay in the EU but to his surprise, the UK with a striking majority of people opted for Leave in the Brexit referendum.

David Cameron campaigned for Britain to Remain in the European Union during the referendum campaign under 'Britain Strong in Europe', in which he emerged as the main political figure in the Remain campaign. On the other hand, the opponent side, which is the Leave campaign that consisted of Vote Leave campaign under its slogan 'Take Back Control', Grassroots out, which was supported by UKIP leader Nigel Farage, and Leave. EU argued for leaving the European Union.

The contribution of media during the referendum campaign also played a significant role in shaping people's attitudes towards Brexit. Eurosceptic newspapers such as *The Sun* and *Daily Mail* fully supported 'Leave', whereas pro-remain newspapers such as *The Guardian* and *The Times* supported 'Remain' in the European Union.

The Brexit referendum results showed a majority of the Leave voters registered in England and Wales, while the proportion of the Remain voters saw an increase in Scotland and

Northern Ireland (“EU Referendum Results”). The British voters’ attitude towards European integration appeared in two dissenting views mainly on the subject of sovereignty, immigration and economy issues, which were discussed during the referendum campaign. Additionally, the Brexit referendum results showed that a majority who identified themselves as British opted for Remain, whereas those who identified themselves as English strongly backed Brexit.

Review of Literature

Much ink has been spilled over Brexit; many scholars, journalists and critics examined and interpreted Brexit from various angles. Rudolf G. Adam, in his book *Brexit Causes and Consequences* (2020), documents the historical events that contributed and led to the occurrence of Brexit, and provides the probable costs that this phenomenon would bring. Adam declares that “Brexit is a paradigm of how not to conduct a referendum” (207). He claims that David Cameron didn’t maneuver his decision for calling for a referendum very well, and a simple ‘in or out’ vote wasn’t the perfect choice to solve a very complex issue that may entail very grave consequences in the future; Adam argues that Cameron’s decision would have deserved “more intensive, systematic and thorough preparations” (207).

In line with this idea, Michelle Cini and Amy Verdun in “*The implications of Brexit for the future of Europe*” contends that the UK exit from the European Union hit its institutions and member states really hard and that the result of the UK’s referendum on EU membership planted a sense of shock through the whole EU; this sentiment wasn’t exclusive just to the UK elites (63). The two authors also draw attention to the UK’s important role within the union, from successfully shaping EU’s initiatives to vetoing decisions in favour of their national interests. Furthermore, Cini and Verdun discussed the implications of Brexit for the future of Europe coming up with two conclusions, either it will weaken and fragment the EU, which they call “the centrifugal trajectory”; or it will lead to greater EU cooperation, hence “the centripetal

trajectory” (64). It all depends on the agendas being pushed by actors that make profit of crises (70).

In an article entitled “*How British was the Brexit Vote*” Gráinne de Búrca investigates the similarities between the Brexit vote and Trump’s election in the USA. De Burca argues that “there is no question that issues gaining traction in the US presidential election and elsewhere resonated with those prominent in the Brexit debate” (52). In her opinion insecurity about issues like immigration and economy, the rise of populist political parties, the rejection of internationalism and the return of nationalism were common points between the two events. Furthermore, they were a major factor contributing to reinforce Eurosceptic sentiments in the UK, hence leading to the win of the Leave campaign (52).

In another significant study, entitled “*The Brexit Vote: A Divided Nation, a Divided Continent*”, Sarah Hoblot reveals that there is a large divide between British voters in reference to geography, age , education and social status. It is a divide “between those who feel left behind by the forces of globalization and mass immigration and those who see it as a welcome opportunity” (1260). Moreover, she argued that the Eurosceptic arguments used in the Leave campaign established anti-immigrants and anti-establishment feelings within the voters (1260).

From another lens, Stefan Auer in his article “*BREXIT, SOVEREIGNTY AND THE END OF AN EVER CLOSER UNION*” argued that sovereignty was a driving force behind Brexit; he asserts that the Leave campaign slogan ‘taking back control’ was principally about democratic sovereignty (42). Auer suggests that the probability of Turkish entrance to the EU and the refugee crises presented a huge risk on Britain’s ability to control its borders, thus resulting in losing their nation’s sovereignty (47). He adds that “the UK may just manage to escape through Brexit” (50), and that it will manage to regain its control over borders and immigration.

Gavin Esler, author of *How Britain Ends: English Nationalism and the Rebirth of the four nations*, in an interview for GQ magazine declares that “English nationalism is the biggest threat to the United Kingdom”. He continues and gives example of Scotland and how they were tricked that they would stay inside the EU: “I think the fact that Scottish people voted to stay in the UK because they were told that was the only way you could stay in the European Union was absolutely crucial. And the people I’ve talked to who voted against independence for Scotland were actually persuaded by that” (Chesterton).

From this review of literature, we can observe that various works examined Brexit from different lenses and angles tackling the causes, the role of Euroscepticism, and the aftermath of Brexit for both the UK and the EU.

Aims of the Study

Our study is an expository research that aims to examine the political elites’ speeches of both Leave and Remain campaigns focusing on the issues of sovereignty, immigration and economy, which were debated during the Brexit Campaign. It aims to explain how the political elites conceive Brexit and how their arguments contributed to influence the public opinion on the Leave and Remain vote. In this study, we examine four speeches delivered by the Leave and Remain campaigns. The Leave campaign speeches consist of Boris Johnson’s speech entitled “*Liberal Cosmopolitan Case to Vote Leave*” and Nigel Farage speech “*Nigel Farage MEP at Grassroots out launch in Kettering*”. On the other hand, the Remain campaign speeches consist of David Cameron speech “*PM Speech on the UK’s strength and security in the EU*” and Jeremy Corbyn’s speech “*Europe needs to change but...I am voting to stay*”. The analysis of the speeches is based on content analysis.

Research Questions

The present research work aims to answer the following research questions:

1. How the issues of national sovereignty, immigration, and economy are conceived by the Leave and Remain campaigners in their political speeches?
2. What are the arguments which were used to convince the majority of British people to vote for 'Leave' or 'Remain'?
3. What are the main factors that determined voting behaviour in the Brexit referendum?

Chapter Division

In terms of the structure, our thesis is divided into three chapters. The first chapter is devoted to the historical background of Brexit, from Britain's early days of European integration to the vote of Brexit. The second chapter introduces the different concepts related to Brexit. Identifying and explaining these concepts enables us to analyse the selected political speeches and to identify the role of these concepts to influence the voting behaviour in the Brexit referendum. The third chapter is dedicated to the analysis of the speeches focusing primarily on the arguments of both the Leave and Remain campaigns, which they provided to persuade the population on the vote choice. In addition to this, analysis the media's influence on the voters' voting behaviour is provided.

Chapter I

Britain's Awkward Position in Europe: From the End of World War II to Brexit

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Britain's Awkward Position in Europe: From the End of World War II to Brexit

Introduction

This chapter reviews the historical background of Brexit by leafing through historical events and reviewing its causes, it explains how this phenomenon has become mainstream in the recent years in the political scene of Britain. It documents the UK's status through the years, starting from the fall of its empire, to the accession to the European Union and the stance of the different Prime Ministers Governments towards it, detailing along the way the issues that contributed to deepen the conflicts between the United Kingdom and the European Union. Accordingly, this chapter sheds light on the causes that pushed Britain to demand a referendum to exit the EU.

1. History of Britain's Membership in the European Union

In order to understand why certain countries take harsh perceptions and attitudes towards others, in the current case the UK and the EU, a deeper look should be taken to their relationship through different periods of time, examining along the way the roots of problems that both sides undergo nowadays.

1.1. From Empire to a Weak Aftermath of WWII

The end of the Second World War displayed the fact that Europe should relieve from the scale of devastation and apocalyptic landscape that stemmed from the outbreak of the war. In addition, two great powers emerged as the USA and USSR became the world leading powers and started to shape their uprising extended hands in economy. Britain's Empire with its long history of supremacy became a soft power as its colonies like India, Pakistan and Nigeria started to claim their freedom, and it endured grave loses during the two world wars.

After WWII, calls for a more united Europe were raising. In the meantime, Britain was looking for another kind of global relations. British patriots were still tasting the bitter taste of the war and they were reluctant, sceptical and in distrust of Europe, especially the Nazi Germany and its allies and all those who did not defend Europe during World War II (Wallwork 25). In addition to this, Britain is an island separated from Europe, and most Brits of that time did not consider themselves as “Europeans”. In his speech in 1946 in Zurich, Winston Churchill declared:

The first step in the re-creation of the European Family must be a partnership between France and Germany... The structure of the United States of Europe will be such as to make the material strength of a single state less important..., and the first practical step would be to form a Council of Europe... France and Germany must take the lead together. Great Britain, the British Commonwealth of Nations, mighty America - and, I trust, Soviet Russia, for then indeed all would be well - must be the friends and sponsors of the new Europe and must champion its right to live. Therefore I say to you “Let Europe arise!” (Churchill)

It is obvious from the quote that the scope of a ‘Continental Europe’ was in Churchill’s eyes, as he was strong advocate for the rebuilding of Europe, under the leadership of France and Germany, whereas he considered Great Britain alongside the British Commonwealth, America and Soviet Russia to be the supporters of this new Europe.

1.2. Economic integration

In 1951, the Treaty of Paris was signed by six European states: France, Germany, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxembourg. These countries agreed to establish European Coal and Steel Community (ECSC), which subsequently became the EEC following the signing of Rome Treaty in 1957 by the six ECSC member states. The treaty established European Atomic

Energy Community (Euratom). The aim of the Treaty was to establish a Customs Union and Common Market, which mainly meant a free trade community where member states can trade freely without tariffs or barriers. The Treaty also aimed to increase agricultural productivity, provide good living standard for the agricultural community, and provide food supply at reasonable prices to customers. This resulted in the creation of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) in 1962 (Stead). The UK was reluctant to participate in the creation of Common Market; the UK also secured its position out in the creation of European Defence Community (EDC), which was founded in 1952.

1.3. De Gaulle and UK application to join the EEC

In 1960, Great Britain along with Austria, Sweden, Denmark, Portugal, and Switzerland established the European Free Trade Association (EFTA). These countries recorded low economic growth compared to the EEC member states (Adam 12). This economic situation led the Prime Minister Harold Macmillan to apply to join the EEC in 1961. However, the French president, De Gaulle, vetoed this application in July 1963 and a second time in May 1967. At a press conference on January 1963, De Gaulle voiced his fears on Britain's application to join the European Economic Community when he claimed that UK's economy is not compatible with EC's:

England in effect is insular, she is maritime, she is linked through her exchanges, her markets, her supply lines to the most diverse and often the most distant countries; she pursues essentially industrial and commercial activities, and only slight agricultural ones. She has in all her doings very marked and very original habits and traditions (86)

De Gaulle also argued that Britain might jeopardize the Common Agricultural Policy as Britain had strong ties preferences with the Commonwealth and mostly USA, “which quickly would have absorbed the community of Europe” (86).

When De Gaulle resigned in 1969, the UK made a third attempt to join the EEC. Finally, the UK’s negotiations under the Conservative government of Edward Heath managed to join the EEC in January 1973 supported by the French president and De Gaulle’s Successor, George Pompidou, following the signing of the European Communities Act, or the Accession Treaty, in 1972.

Politicians promised prosperity and good results for joining. The prime minister at that time Edward Heath declared in 1971 EEC membership debates that “For 25 years, we’ve been looking for something to get us going again. Now here it is” (Wallwork, 27). Things got ever worse after joining in 1973 as social and financial issues ensued in various sectors of the country.

2. Eurosceptic Britain and Policy Dynamics on European Integration

2.1. The First Referendum

In 1975, under the new Labour Party government, the UK held a referendum on whether to stay or leave the EEC. It came after the Labour government had renegotiated terms of membership the year before. The main areas of concern in the 1974-75 renegotiations regarded the Common Agriculture Policy, Britain’s contribution to the EEC budget, the goals of the economic and monetary Union, harmonization of VAT, and the sovereignty of Parliament (Miller 1). The majority (67%) voted in favour and chose to stay within (Jeffery and Perman 13). The decision to remain in the EEC was supported by both Labour and Conservative leaders, Harold Wilson and Margaret Thatcher.

2.2. Margaret Thatcher (1979-1990)

The Conservative government under Margaret Thatcher's leadership came to power in 1979 with more aims associated with monetarism. Mrs. Thatcher attempted to tackle the issue of the 'Sickman of Europe'¹ and resolve the UK's economic decline, which lasted from post WWII to the late 1970s. After joining the EEC in 1973, Britain experienced high inflation and an enforced three-day week amid the Coalminers' strike. Therefore, Thatcher implemented monetary and fiscal policies as a macroeconomic policy in order to control money supply and trim back inflation.

The 'Iron Lady' grew critical of Europe's arrangements and contended that Britain's huge contributions to the EEC returned with little benefit to the UK. Thatcher's Euroscepticism appeared when she successfully managed to negotiate the Rebate in 1984 so that to lower the UK's financial contribution to the EEC budget. Her words "I want my money back" refers to the little financial support did the UK receive from the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) regarding to the UK's high VAT taxes on food imports.

Thatcher's ideology centred upon privatization and liberalization of free market economy; she believed that Britain's independence and authority suffered under centralized European authorities. Her skeptical views on further integration on European policies appeared especially after the socialist Jacques Delors, president of the European Commission, set the EMU reform towards socialism and started voicing his dreams of a federal Europe (Jeffery and Perman 14). Thatcher's European vision turns more to express her disposition to liberal intergovernmental relations with Europe, which emerged in her well-known Bruges Speech (1988), and her dispute on European Policies aimed to keep Britain independent from the EU.

¹A country that is politically or economically unsound, especially in comparison with its neighbors.

Margaret Thatcher and her Conservative Party were reluctant to join the ERM², which was created in 1979. Thatcher's views on integration into the monetary union pinned in "rolling back frontiers". In her Bruges Speech in 1988, Thatcher says: "We have not successfully rolled back the frontiers of the state in Britain, only to see them re-imposed at a European level with a new dominance from Brussels" (Thatcher). It is clear from this quote that Thatcher took an opponent stance towards such 'supranational Projects' on the European integration (Kaplan 8).

All these issues pushed Thatcher to resign in 1990. Before her resignation in 1990, she linked the pound sterling to the ERM in 1990; she was persuaded by her Chancellor, John Major, who succeeded her as prime minister in 1990.

2.3. John Major (1990-1997)

During Major's premiership, Britain entered the European Union (EU) following the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992, the culmination of the Maastricht summit in 1991, which was officially set under the Single European Act 1986 (SEA) that aimed to complete the single Market. This program was accepted by Margaret Thatcher who wished the liberalization of free market and economic reform. The SEA would later become a climacteric point in the UK-EU relationship, and trigger a sceptic attitude towards European membership due to a passage in the Treaty associated with supranational governance. The passage introduced a central banking system and the Euro as the single currency and a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP).

The Maastricht Treaty also established the four freedoms: free movement of people, goods, services, and capital. Major had to deal with this issue, which led to split the Conservative Party into pro-European Europhiles and Eurosceptic Tory rebels whose belief is

² ERM was "a system introduced by The European Economic Community in 1979 as part of the European Monetary System (EMS), to reduce exchange rate variability and achieve stability before member countries moved to a Single Currency".

in Margaret Thatcher's anti-European integration attitude, and foremost her contestant position to the single currency along with Bill Cash and Teddy Taylor who claimed against a continued membership within the EU (Aspinwall 358).

John Major had to deal with Eurosceptic MPs who feared that the treaty would lead towards the 'United States of Europe', and hence he negotiated an opt-out from the single currency by passing the Treaty in UK parliament to a vote of no confidence in 1992.

Meanwhile, the other part of the 'influential' pro-European Conservative MPs took steps to embrace the single currency including Kenneth Clarke and Michael Heseltine, who held considerable position within the cabinet alongside Eurosceptics. In fact pro-European, ministers balance the proportion of Eurosceptic members within the cabinet such as Michael Howard, John Redwood, and Michael Portillo, who 'acted as de facto proxies for the parliamentary party on European integration' (Aspinwall 358).

The political turmoil under the Conservative government of John Major continued: the Danish referendum in June 1992 and Black Wednesday³ in September 1992 induced a more Eurosceptic movements. In addition to this, the subsequent emergence of hard Eurosceptic groups like UK Independent Party (UKIP) in 1993, which took a dissenting position to the Maastricht Treaty ratification (Abedi; Lunberg 78).

The Conservative government of John Major diverged from what Thatcher saw in her contribution to British foreign policy before him. Thatcher's approach had always rhetorically attributed British foreign policy problems to Europe, and one of her prevailing concerns was

³**Black Wednesday:** On September 16, 1992, the buying and selling of currencies culminated as the pound crashed and collapsed in consequence of the currency trader's excessive selling of the sterling. As a result, the UK withdrew from the ERM in 1992, after two years of membership following their inability to stop the pound from falling below ERM thresholds.

on a 'federal European superstate' prevailed by Germany (Kieninger) and she was more growing hostile to 'supranational integration'. On the contrary, John Major was more favourable to rebuild the relationship with the 'United Germany' under leadership of the German Chancellor Helmut Kohland and he was far more inclined to place his country at 'the very heart of Europe' (Kieninger).

The Labour Party in opposition obtained the advantage to expand in European policy while the Conservative Party during the second Major Government (1992-1997) split over the agreement in terms of Britain's membership in European policy. Major's partnership with Europe exacerbated as many Conservative Eurosceptic Backbench MPs proved to be skeptical to European projects. In 1996, Major's government pursued 'Non-cooperation' policy with Europe when Europe banned the exportation of the 'Beef' from Britain during BSE crisis. It was a key factor for Labours to react against the Conservatives government shortcomings in contribution to European policy.

Major's activity and accountability to the House of Commons declined and he was considered as "in office but not in power". Once again, in 1996, the Major's economic interest defeated and the split continued until his loss of 1997 general election.

2.4. European Intergovernmental Relations Under The Leadership of Tony Blair and Gordon Brown (1997-2010)

The "New Labour" government, under the leadership of Tony Blair, defeated Conservatives in a landslide electoral victory in 1997. The whole process to reform and construct a new government sheds lights on Blair's projection of a constructive disposition to European policy. The 1997 Labour manifesto with its pro-European stance, came with a strong desire of a considerable ministerial position within the EU. In fact, the Labour Party maintained a positive portion to join the single currency, which was introduced by the Maastricht Treaty,

and they promised to hold a referendum on it. In its first years in office, Blair's government set an agenda to reform Major's policies towards the EU.

New Labour government brought some sort of changes in policy in relation with Europe and the matter was discussed in the Amsterdam European Council in June 1997, which resulted the Intergovernmental Conference (IGC)⁴, and subsequently, the signing of Amsterdam Treaty in October 1997. The latter ratified the Maastricht Treaty and Tony Blair signed the chapter of social policy, which was disputed by the Tories, Margaret Thatcher who delivered her famous Bruges speech, and with opt-outs under the Major Conservative Eurosceptics. It was an alternative system for Blair instead of dealing with market economics (Smith 1285) and filed a copy of the new document away for new government record.

Tony Blair, who is pro-European, came with the purpose of EU enlargement project and intended to pursue Intergovernmental European integration. He openly suggested an 'Intergovernmental European Union' and he argued that Britain's integration in European Union shouldn't be run by an 'unaccountable' authority, which is supranationalism, but instead should be built on the basis of intergovernmental governance that would make a 'Europe of sovereign nations'(Kaplan 122). Similarly, to what Bulmer described Blair's New Labour's policy as that "has been characterized by utilitarian supranationalism" (597).

Tony Blair pinned his attention to strengthen Europe's role in the world and centralize Britain as a key role in European policymaking taking into account Defence policy, which was undertaken by his Foreign Secretary Robin Cook (Bulmer 602). Drawing conclusions at ST. Malo declaration 1998, the Anglo-French initiative agreed on the creation of a European Defence Force and springs concrete 'defence Identity' in Europe. Likewise, Tony Blair's contribution to the creation of European Security and Defence Policy (ESDP) aimed to create

⁴ Conferences of representatives of the governments of the member states are convened to discuss and agree EU treaty changes".

peacekeeping forces attempting to monitor cease-fires in the countries where the war and violence exists and an example of that is exercising military troops in the Balkans. Another mission was played on the ground when Blair sent troops to solve the Kosovo Crisis in 1999.

Tony Blair was reelected for the second time in June 2001 marking the Labour's second government (2001-2005). However, this time Blair found it difficult to maintain positive partnership with Europe where division between European states came to the surface in terms of European Policy. This appeared due to the outcome of Blair's intervention in foreign policy issues such as furnishing his support to George W. Bush's 'War on terror'. This latter refers to when Bush declared to invade Afghanistan in 2001 as a response to the terrorist attacks of 11 September 2001, followed by the invasion on Iraq in 2003. The latter became the centre-ground issue of a shaken relationship with Germany and France.

Gordon Brown, Blair's successor as Prime Minister and leader of the Labour Party (2007- 2010) followed the steps of his predecessor in establishing friendlier EU relationships, except for refusing taking part in the membership of the Euro (Jeffery and Perman 14).

During Brown's Premiership, the world got hit by a financial crisis in 2008; in consequence Brown's government put in place some fiscal and monetary policies in hopes to keep the banks afloat. This decision resulted in putting the United Kingdom in a difficult situation as the national debt increased spectacularly. In an interview years later Gordon Brown admitted that he made a "big mistake" in handling the banking crises saying "We didn't understand just how entangled things were" ("Gordon Brown admits 'big mistake'").

The thirteen years of Labour government would eventually come to an end in 2010 as the Conservative Party, under the leadership of David Cameron, won the general elections to become the next Prime Minister.

2.5. David Cameron and the Making of Brexit (2010-2016)

David Cameron was elected as a new leader of the Tory Party in 2005. He called his Conservative Party to “stop banging on about Europe” to avoid the fourth successive defeat in the upcoming election and focus on the concerns that most voters really cared about (Hunt). When David Cameron became prime minister in 2010, he established a coalition government with Liberal Democrats. In 2011, 81 of Conservative MPs voted in favour of motion calling for a referendum on EU membership making it the biggest rebellion any Conservative Prime minister had seen (Hunt).

The United Kingdom Independence Party, which calls for the UK’s withdrawal from the EU, started to gain momentum and popularity as it started to threaten the Conservative Party in marginal seats. To avoid the UKIP to beat the Conservative Party in the 2015 election, and to settle the enduring issue between pro-Europeans and Eurosceptics concerning the European integration, Cameron promised an in-out referendum on Britain’s EU membership if his Conservative Party won the general election in 2015, and therefore, leave the public opinion decide on their own destiny. He said in the EU Bloomberg speech: “And when we have negotiated that new settlement, we will give the British people a referendum with a very simple in-or-out choice to stay in the EU on these new terms; or come out altogether. It will be an in/out referendum” (Cameron).

However, Cameron’s EU course turned polemic within the other member parties. For instance, Nick Clegg described Cameron’s EU course as ‘suicidal’ regarding to its aim to reform UK’s relations with the European Union, and therefore, his course may “jeopardize the long-term national interest (“Nick Clegg Calls Cameron’s Course ‘Suicidal’”). When the Conservative Party’s Manifesto won the general election in 2015, Cameron went through with

his promise and announced an in-out referendum by establishing the European yes/no Referendum Act in 2015.

3. The Brexit

David Cameron's decision to call for a referendum was not only a build-up of all the previous stated events, but it was due to other causes as well. This ensemble of causes led Britain to exit the European Union.

3.1. Causes of Brexit

Several factors have played a crucial role in pushing for a referendum. These factors varied from social, political, cultural and economical reasons; the most prominent ones alongside Euroscepticism are Britain's sovereignty, immigration, economy and financial contributions, the 2008 financial crisis, asylum seekers, security, and terrorism.

3.1.1. Britain's Sovereignty

As the years passed, more power has been transferred from the heart of Britain to a centralized EU government. UK sovereignty was in peril as laws were overruled and decisions were forced upon Britain's government. This matter pushed further the cause of Eurosceptics as they argued that Britons never voted to join a federal Europe, nor did they agree on the supremacy of EU law over the UK's. In 1971, Edward Heath assured in the white paper on joining the EEC "no erosion of essential national sovereignty", yet in 1972 a law was passed, the European Communities Act, which basically gave the consent on EU law supremacy (Wallwork 34).

In 2015, David Cameron reoccurred his firm pledge to hold a referendum on any further transfer of powers to the European Union and take the UK parliamentary sovereignty back from the European court of justice (ECJ). The European Union Act of 2011 provided the

necessity to hold a referendum before any EU treaty willing to transfer of powers from UK to Brussel.

3.1.2. Immigration

Immigration was one of the prominent issues that caused Brexit to happen. Being a member of the EU, the UK as other EU27 countries must take part in conforming to the EU laws. Accordingly, the EU Citizens enjoy the right of the four freedoms, which were established by the Maastricht Treaty (1992) and the right of free movement of workers, which was created under the Treaty of Rome (1957). In addition, as it is stated in the Article 45 of Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) (1957) the abolishment of discrimination of nationality between workers of member states and balance the rights of individuals within the EU territory. This means that UK and EU citizens had the right to move freely within member states territory. EU citizens also benefited from the right of employment and residence within the 27 European countries.

Britons were lulled to believe that these immigrants were the cause of financial decline, taking up their jobs, destroying their identity, and summing terror and fear in the Kingdom, especially after the influx of 2004 immigrants from Communist Eastern European countries, also called A8 countries, entered Britain with permanent residence. Rowinski stresses that “the western Europeans and subsequent 2004 eastern European influx are better educated than the average Briton. More have finished secondary education and university degrees” (189). These Immigrants achieved higher employment rates with 88 percent compared to UK citizens with 77 percent. Moreover, EU migrants were more likely to profit from unemployment benefits than those of British citizens. In this context, Rowinski states that “In terms of EU immigrant ‘benefit tourism’, 0.2 per cent claim unemployment benefit but have never worked in the UK;

and 0.4 per cent are on unemployment benefit six months after arriving in the UK, rising to 0.8 per cent after a year” (189).

A pre-referendum study found that in relation to immigration, people desire control because they fear its impact on the values and ways of life of society regardless of their individual experience (McLaren and Johnson 715). In their turn, the cultural factor and the social status played a big role on how British people viewed immigration, the lowest their social status was the more they were threatened by immigration (Adam 37).

3.1.3. Economy and Financial Contributions

One of the main reasons that pushed for Brexit was economy. Several factors were seen to be a burden for the economy of the UK. Among those factors is having to make financial contributions to the EU’s annual budget. The UK argued that what they contribute is much bigger than what they benefit from the EU. In fact, they are considered as one of the biggest contributors to the European Union, but some choose to ignore is that the UK benefits as well from the EU in much complex ways that are hard to estimate. One can mention the easy access to EU’s markets and the flow of investments, which enabled Britain to sell their products there and vice versa.

Another point is that the UK felt bound to the European Union when negotiating trade deals. They were obliged to negotiate as part of the EU bloc, so they wanted to leave in order to negotiate their own trade deals.

3.1.4. The 2008 Financial Crisis

In 2008, an economic crisis hit Europe affecting gravely the Euro as currencies crashed. Britain wasn’t affected badly as their currency was the Pound Sterling. The country witnessed a high number of EU migrants seeking for jobs and an escape from the neighbour countries in hope to find financial prosperity.

John Van Reenen, the Director of the Centre for Economic Performance and Professor of Economics at London School of Economics, conducted a study in which he demonstrated that UK residents suffered economic difficulties over the last decade. The statistics of the study demonstrated that UK's real wages fell by over 8% in six years after 2008 financial crisis, followed by pay cuts and austerity packages (Reenen ii).

Surprisingly, Reenen asserted that "EU migrants are part of the solution, not part of the problem" (ii). This means that, in contrary to Eurosceptics beliefs, the financial crisis had no direct relation to migration.

3.1.5. Asylum Seekers, Security, and Terrorism

The outbreak of the conflict in Syria gave rise to mass migrants to seek for refuge and asylum in Europe. Over 1.3 million asylum into Europe recorded in 2015. They originated from Syria, Afghanistan, and Iraq ("Number of Refugees to Europe").

Europe's free movement rules were put into question after the November 2015 Paris attacks, when suicide bombers left hundreds of wounded and 130 people lost their lives ("Paris Attacks"), and the 2016 Brussels attacks, in which 30 people went victim and dozens injured of a blast at Brussels international airport and a city Metro Station ("Brussel Attacks"). The terrorists were identified as foreigners who claimed to be refugees who entered the Schengen area and executed the attacks.

3.1.6. Media Coverage on European Affairs

From 1973 onwards, Britain's membership in the EU triggered some alternatives and some major adjustments in Britain media reports on EU, as they shifted from 'permissive consensus to destructive dissent' (Daddow 1219). Daddow in a statement described UK media

as having “vigorously partisan hostility bordering on a nationalist and in some arenas xenophobic approach to coverage of European affairs” (1219).

Right wing Press such as *The Daily Telegraph* and *The Times*, as denoted by Young and Foster, emerged with notable Eurosceptic views in the 1990s (Copeland and Copsey (4). Looking at framing Brexit campaign debate, Mason claimed that Nigel Farage's media debuts helped to reinforce the public perception of immigration aspects regarding the EU. The British media portrayed immigrants as thieves of British jobs, draining on the system. Another example could be on economic status, giving the EU 300 million each week. According to Hawkins the pejorative content of UK media coverage on EU in the UK strikes more ‘problematic’ than reporting in the EU as the outcome, alien the national consciousness from positive accomplishments of the EU (562). Furthermore, Legewie, Neumayer, and Epifanio argues that the contribution of media coverage on terrorist attacks is crucially conducive to an impact on public mental attitudes (Bove et al 2).

3.2. The Brexit Campaign

As soon as a referendum was announced to decide the faith of the UK inside the EU, two sides rose to promote their stand points either to leave or to remain in relation to European integration. Campaigning plays a huge role in directing people’s judgment and that proved correct in the Brexit race.

The Leave campaign consisted of UK Independence Party, People Before Profit Alliance (PBP), Traditional Unionist Voice (TUV), and Democratic Unionist Party (DUP). The electoral commission designated Vote Leave, as the official Leave campaign. Many political figures were involved in this campaign such as Gisela Stuart, Dominic Cummings, Matthew Elliot, Boris Johnson, Michael Gove, and others. Vote Leave coined ‘Take Back Control’ as their slogan that campaigned to leave the European Union. In addition to other organizations

such as Leave. EU, and Grassroots Out, which was supported by UKIP leader Nigel Farage, Labour MP Kate Hoey, and Conservative ex-minister Liam Fox. The Leave campaign gave numerous arguments for quitting the European Union putting strong emphasis on immigration and border control and saving the huge sum money that is given to the EU (“Why Vote Leave”).


On the other hand, the Remain campaign consisted of the Conservative Party, Green Party of England and Wales, Labour Party, Liberal Democrats, Plaid Cymru, Scottish Green Party, Scottish National Party (SNP), Sinn Fein, Alliance Party of Northern Ireland, Green Party Northern Ireland, Ulster Unionist Party, and Social Democrats and Labour Party (SDLP). The electoral commission declared ‘Britain Stronger in Europe’ as their official Remain campaign. Many political groups and figures were involved in the campaign like: David Cameron, Jeremy Corbyn, Jo Cox, George Osborne and many others (“For or against Brexit”). The Remain Campaign argued that if Britain leaves the EU, it will lose a massive amount of goodwill from other people of Europe. Additionally, Britain will be more successful economically as part of the EU rather than outside of it, as this latter is the world’s largest economic area. They claimed that Britain is much stronger in Europe than out (“For or against Brexit”).

The Brexit referendum was held on June 23rd 2016, the long awaited day had come and the British people had to choose on that ballot a simple in or out choice like Prime Minister Cameroun had said.

3.3. Brexit Referendum Results


The 2016 UK referendum on European membership officialised the end of and after 43 years of its membership within the EU, Britain with a turnout of 72, 2 percent, 52 percent of people voted to leave the European Union while the rest minority of 48 percent voted for remain (“EU Referendum Results”).

Figure 1:



Source: https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/politics/eu_referendum/results.

Figure 2:



Source: <https://lordashcroftpolls.com/2016/06/how-the-united-kingdom-voted-and-why/>.

The Brexit referendum result showed that those who opted for Remain vote option are generally the young generation who did not exceed the age of 45, and those who have high level

of education and those of large national income who lives in urban cities. On the other hand, the leave voters consist of older people of more than 65 years, those with low formal qualifications and have low national income, and most of them live in rural areas. The result revealed a majority of Leave vote was recorded in England and Wales, whereas Scotland and Northern Ireland saw an increase of Remain vote (Ashcroft).

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that Britain's decision to call for a referendum and quit the European Union was a result of different recent and old historical events. The United Kingdom has always been the awkward member of the EU due its different cultural, social, political and geographical status. Besides, the rise of Euroscepticism among the Conservative Party, and the rise of the UK Independence Party played a huge role deepening the existent differences. In addition to Euroscepticism, and other important concepts played a significant role in pushing for Brexit and determining voting behaviour in Britain. This would be the concern of the second chapter.

Chapter II

The main Key Factors that Determined Britain's Public Voting Behaviour

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Introduction

Citizen's attitudes and their opposition to European membership stems from different factors that have significant influence on the voting behaviour. The present chapter tries to elucidate which Euroscepticism came in opposition to European policies and to the construction of 'cultural European' identity in Britain, was charged with anti-immigration and anti-European identity sentiments. In addition to this, it shows how utilitarianism, and the divide between 'winners' and 'losers' of globalization, the impact of the existence of the 'Other' on living standards underpin voters' attitude to determine the leave vote. This Chapter sheds lights on the Brexit referendum environment and its outcome by focusing on the key concepts and issues that undergo discussions during the Brexit campaign debate particularly Euroscepticism, nationalism and national identity, cosmopolitanism, and utilitarianism.

1. Euroscepticism

1.1. Definition in the Literature

Euroscepticism is defined as a political ideology, which defines political actors and member states that characterized by anti-EU sentiment towards European integration and its policy. The first use of the term traces back to the British press in 1985. The term generally was used in the body of British politics when the term Eurosceptic utilized interchangeably with the term 'anti-marketeer'⁵, 'these latter had altogether rejected continued EEC membership during the 1975 referendum' (Spiering 128-129).

⁵ Anti-marketeer: Refers to British right wing of the Conservative Party.

Criticism of European integration as it stands in political spectrum evoked interest in the development of the academic study of Euroscepticism. The latter, is defined by Taggart in his work on Euroscepticism *“A Touchstone of Dissent: Euroscepticism in contemporary Western European Party Systems”* as the “idea of contingent or qualified opposition, as well as incorporating outright and unqualified opposition to the process of European integration” (366). He asserted that Party-based Euroscepticism coexists with large members of social movements and political protest.

Taggart and Szczerbiak refined this conceptualization, and collaborated to provide a clear-cut definition and distinguished between ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ Euroscepticism. In their article *“Parties, Positions and Europe: Euroscepticism in the EU Candidate States of Central and Eastern Europe”* they conceptualized each of hard Euroscepticism as principled objection to European political and economic integration as their parties advocates disengagement of their countries from the EU or opposing to EU project and any further EU integration (10). The concept typically develops with the emergence of UKIP in Britain in 1994. This opposition “comes from the belief that the EU is counter to deeply held values or, more likely, is the embodiment of negative values” (10). On the contrary, soft Euroscepticism is “NOT a principled objection to European integration or EU membership but where concerns on one (or a number) of policy areas leads to the expression of qualified opposition to the EU” (Taggart and Szczerbiak 2).

Kopecky and Mudde criticized Taggart and Szczerbiak’s categorization and asserted that it suffers from shortage of standard categorization (300). According to them, ‘soft’ Euroscepticism is a consequence of every disagreement with any aspects of EU policy. Their alternative categorization of party-based Euroscepticism conceptualizes Euroscepticism in distinction between diffuse and specific support for European integration (300).

Starting from Easton's landmark studies of political regimes, Kopecky and Mudde define diffuse as "support for the general ideas of European integration", whereas specific means "support for the general practice of European integration" (300).

Flood proposed six categories of Euroscepticism projected on alignments of party positions towards EU. These categories replace Taggart/Szczerbiak and Kopecky/Mudde classification, and are as presented in an order of left-to-right script: rejectionist, revisionist, minimalist, gradualist, reformist and maximalist (5).

Relying on Taggart and Szczerbiak's hard and soft Euroscepticism, Rovny identified two scaled axes distinguishing between 'magnitude' and 'motivation' of EU opposition (38) while Conti proposed five continuum categories of party politics disposition to the EU, and these are hard Euroscepticism, soft Euroscepticism, no commitment, functional Europeanism and identity Europeanism (19). Conti's argues that the main goal of hard Eurosceptic party is the radical change of the EU trajectory or country withdrawal transferring powers to the member states (19). In the practical usage of hard/soft Euroscepticism is that hard Euroscepticism is the usual term based on a principled protestation while soft Euroscepticism focused on reforming EU policies lining up directions towards intergovernmental integration (19).

In his writings about British Euroscepticism and criticism on EU, Lord Haskins suggested a typology of six categories for classification of group position towards the EU, which works in similar with the general term Euroscepticism and they are: 'europhobes', 'ultranationalist europhobics' and 'euro critics', 'Euro-agnostic', 'Euro-realist' and 'Euro-pragmatist'. These terms are adopted and used in politics in defining positions towards EU integration and incorporated into expressions in communication while addressing the public (Daddow 313).

1.2. British Euroscepticism

In the literature, the concept of Euroscepticism is recognized in EU studies to discuss Britain's 'awkward' position in its membership in the EU (Kaplan 7). Young and Forster asserted that Euroscepticism sprang out from right-wing journalism (Copeland and Copsey (2). Daddow argued that Eurosceptic newspapers of Rupert Murdoch contributed to the increase level of Euroscepticism (1222).

Forster concurs with what Stephen George saw in British Euroscepticism in its extreme direction 'which is hostile to British participation in the European Union' and more its tendency that it hints to obtain great advantages from the disintegration from the EU (Daddow 314).

Gifford holds that Euroscepticism is strongly known within the right-wing of the British Conservative Party politicians who expressed reluctant attitude to the second application for European integration during 1980s and 1990s (852). As a matter of fact, recent academic research on Euroscepticism shows that British politics is characterized by distinctive characteristics of opposition. For Szczebiak and Taggart, Euroscepticism can be defined as the politic of opposition as they explain that:

The first [point] is that opposition to the EU brings together 'strange bedfellows' of some very different ideologies. Opposition extends from new politics, old far left politics through regionalism to new populism and neo-fascism in the far right. The second point is that opposition to the EU seems to be related to the positions of parties in their systems. It differentiates between parties at the core and those at the periphery in the sense that wholly Eurosceptical parties are at the peripheries of their party systems while parties at the core are generally not Eurosceptical (5)

Gifford argues that British Euroscepticism is exceptional in relation to its politics of the mainstream to the outcome that British Euroscepticism is featured by its two mainstream parties that stands in the political spectrum, which are Centre-left and Centre-right (854). In Fact, the mainstream British Conservative Party emerged with its disposition to ‘soft Euroscepticism’ in its relation to the EU. Gifford argues that British Euroscepticism is featured by a distinct movement that aims to defend the principles of Britishness and Britain (857). He argues that the discourse of Eurosceptic mobilization and manifestation of British Euroscepticism as populism as an opposition to the Maastricht treaty ratification is featured by an appeal to the people based upon the cultural and symbolic construction of British Exceptionalism (852).

Paul Taggart and Alex Szczerbiak’s study of Euroscepticism found, as reported by Eurobarometer surveys for 2003, a gradual decline in the British national support for European integration (Daddow 311). Along similar conclusions, in 1992, Christopher Andersen and Braden Smith studied Euroscepticism in the period between 1995 to 2003 and subsequently found that Britain along with Sweden, Denmark and Finland outranked the highest Eurosceptic member states. Relying on previous outcomes, scholars observations are drawn from common conclusions that Britain ‘is one of the most skeptical members of the EU’ (Daddow 311).

Carey argues that national identity is one of the significant factors that reflects citizen’s attitudes towards the European Union, he demonstrated that people who have strong sentiments of national identity exhibit less support to EU membership (393). Other studies by McLaren indicated that Euroscepticism is found in groups with hostile and antagonistic attitudes towards other cultures like those brought by immigrants (Hobolt 1265). Hooghe and Marks showed that those who idealize their national identity as exclusive of the other’s identity are ranked higher to be considered as Eurosceptic individuals (424-425). Therefore, Hobolt presumes that Leave

Vote choice reflects people's attitudes that has been driven by their strong national identity, especially English identity (1265).

1.3. Schools of Euroscepticism

The issue of European integration has long been studied within the academic discipline of International Relations (IR) instead of Comparative Politics. However, in the 1990s, because of the populist reaction to the Maastricht Treaty, the latter changed the structure of European studies that was mostly admired by Europhiles, but now is shaped into a new diagram discussed issues such as domestic and foreign policy and divided the EU political studies into traditional and new subdivisions. This, in fact, contributed to the emergence of 'Euroscepticism studies', which cropped up in the academic studies appearing in two schools of different perspectives and explanations as regards to what Mudde has distinguished between Sussex and North Carolina schools of Euroscepticism (193).

The Sussex school derived from the seminal articles of Paul Taggart and Aleks Szczerbiak. This school centralized its attention on an in-depth limited 'national' case studies and conceptual issues. North Carolina school on the other hand, stems from the works of Lisbet Hooghe, Gary Marks and Leonard Ray. On the study of party position to European integration, the utilization of methodology on how the Sussex school studies political parties is distinctly different from North Carolina. The Sussex school depends on qualitative studies or comparative analysis; on the other hand, North Carolina school relies on quantitative, longitudinal data (Mudde 197), While the two reeling on both 'strategic and ideological' considerations (Vasilopoulou 156). Additionally, The Sussex School is a limited study and deals with national case study, whereas, North Carolina school is a general study and puts more attention on traditional social and political divisions. However, the theoretical contribution of the study of party position to EU Integration has been the cleavage theory on party positions on European

integration. Mixed method approach was called by Mudde, who is considered as the leading proponent of combining works from both schools understandings and provides “the most promising avenue for future research” (201).

1.4. Right Wing Populism

The UK witnessed the dominance of two national political sides, which are the left wing and the right wing. Large tensions spark between the two sides, as the left wing is often associated with the search for equal society, increased regulations on business, imposing higher taxes on the rich, often embracing progressing views, for instance refusing the death penalty, supporting same sex marriage and women’s right to abortion; having lenient views on immigration. On the other hand, the right wing tend to hold more traditional, conservative and religious views than the left, especially on matters that the left support like same sex marriage, abortion and immigration. Parties on the left include the Green Party and the Labour Party. Parties on the right include the Conservative Party and UK Independent Party (UKIP).

Since the 1980’s, many Western Europe countries have witnesses a rise of a right wing populist parties, these latter became mainstream in those countries (Rydgren 414). Economic and sociocultural cleavages have seen an increase in the past few decades, and one of the main reasons is immigration and multiculturalism. Immigrants became unemployed, marginalized and the bottom of the workforce. Rydgren explains that the Growing cultural and economic cleavage has expanded political opportunities for the Right Wing parties (421). Other factors add on to that, such as the issue of border and immigration control, welfare expenditure, unemployment, housing, health, national-ethnic culture, and European policy; all these matters contributed to the rise of popular right wing parties.

UKIP are totally nationalists, besides they opt out more for English nationalism, “Englishness”, rather than “Britishness”. Nigel Farage claimed Scottish independence referendum in 2014 was

about the fight of anti-Englishness, fascists, and racists, rather than about independence (Hayton 404).

One of the most well-known and mainstream right wing parties in the UK is UKIP. This latter often argues that the European Union is a corrupt institution that mainly serves elites interests. Alongside with British National Party, UKIP developed a policy that argues for UK withdrawing from the EU (Abedi; Lundberg 73-76). New more restrictive immigration controls were being introduced by the Leave campaign in the Brexit referendum, in order to protect hospitals, welfare, housing, education, jobs, and living standards (Crisp). This means that the Leave campaign accused immigration for the decline of wages and welfare; the campaign was pitched as a defense of working class living standards. The protection of this latter required the nation to be protected; hence, class was merged with nationalism. Obviously, the campaign attracted a great number of voices as the majority voted to leave the EU, it seems that there was something in their campaign that appealed to the voters and convinced that Britain was better off Europe.

2. Nationalism, National identity and the Construction of the ‘Other’

Michael Billig defines the concept of nationalism as an ideology that characterizes the nation and members of a particular community by its natural and ideal principals. Billig argues that nationalism “is associated with those who struggle to create new states or with extreme right-wing politics” (5). We can see nationalism in ‘banal’ practices for example in language, and the use of words such as ‘us’, ‘our’ and ‘here’ that indicates for nationalism (Andreouli; Nicholson 1325). Nationalism can be seen in ‘banal’ situations in a particular country such as the waving of national flags, and in talk such as ‘we’ and ‘they’ taking for granted national ‘we’ against national ‘others’(Andreouli).

According to Carey, our sense of identity and belonging have a strong connection between individuals and their neighborhood, their town or their nation (392). De Cillia, Reisigl, and Wodak reviewed this conception based on Anderson's work and explains that the notion of national identity depends on certain presumptions: the first one is political communities and the second one is based on the notion of identity that undergo many interpretations delivered by discourse, language and other semiotic systems (Der Zwet et al 521). Third, relying on Bourdieu's studies on the concept 'habitus', they deduce that identity is a compound of common idea. Forth they assert that Construction of national identities occurs simultaneously with the construction of difference. Fifth there may exist more than one identity and they are liable to differ and change with time (521).

The construction of difference occurs in the existing of the "other" who doesn't belong and is generally viewed as 'them' as simply they may be considered as an 'outgroup' that coexist in paradox in relation to 'us' as the 'in-group' (Der Zwet et al 521). Thereby, national identity includes the distinction between 'us', the nation taking into account the historical and cultural heritage and "them", the foreigners, from which we can differentiate ourselves from foreigners (Simonsen 357). These foreigners become the 'significant others' who took deep roots of influence on the ethnic national identity and the threat of their presence regarding the difference in their culture (Der Zwet et al 522).

In social anthropology, studies focus on boundaries between groups and how they are expressed. For instance, the work of Barth, in which he concludes groups attribute different identities to their own members and other group and to members of those other group may be regarded as 'strangers'. These boundaries may be the cause of ethnic-based nationalisms and antagonisms. (15, 16). McCrone asserted that "nationalism grows best in a medium in which there is an Other – an enemy or rival against which we can measure and develop our identity" (184). The other may be found in both within and outside a nation. Some groups may be viewed

as a threat to societal values and interest, what's more they trigger 'moral panic' (Der Zwet et al 522).

Eralp argues that identity exists by its two fundamental subdivisions 'identifier' and 'identified' (İnaç and Ünal 223). İnaç and Ünal argue that the individual represents identified as a 'self' whereas the society is described as identifier as 'other' (223). Piaget and Weil concluded that children prior to five years can perceive a little bit about their own country and national group and gradually they begin to put themselves in national group that characterizes them (Barrett, Lyons, and del Valle 2).

Britishness as defined by the Cambridge Dictionary is the fact of being British, or having qualities that are considered typical for British people. It is the sense of belonging to Britain. Cultural differences matter for the British people who pride themselves on their language, history, values, beliefs, customs, rituals and traditions (Hall 125). National identities are being formed and transformed continually, and people's sense of Britishness is bound up with a set of moral meanings of how things should be (135).

Academic studies have made links between identity, Euroscepticism and the Leave vote. Haesly found that the strength of support for the EU in Scotland and Wales is diverse, determining it to be stronger in Scotland and that EU support in Wales was sometimes used to differentiate from the English (97). Links have been drawn between their Euroscepticism and a sense of Britishness when coming to favour a British identity over a European one (Haesly 93-94). Other studies suggests that British or European identity is linked with Remain and English with Leave (Clarke, Goodwin and Whitely 453). Sara Hobolt asserts that strong national identity is linked with the Leave vote (1967). Hooghe and Marks concludes that:

Citizens take the economic consequences of market integration into account, both for themselves and their countries. They evaluate European integration in terms of their communal identities their views

towards foreigners and foreign cultures. Further, their attitudes are cued by their ideological placement and by elites and political parties (436-37)

Paxman argues that “the English put their faith in institutions. It is the present crisis of institutions which is the crisis of Britishness. And the crisis of Britishness is the crisis of Englishness” (Paxman). Even though British identity is labeled as a sort of state identity, the other nations that constitute the kingdom (Wales, Scotland and Ireland) do not share the same interests and views with England. This justifies the inconsistent attitudes towards European integration and the different results in the Brexit referendum.

3. Union Citizenship: Cosmopolitanism

Waldron defines Cosmopolitanism as “a way of being in the world, a way of constructing an identity for oneself that is different from, and arguably opposed to, the idea of belonging to or devotion to or immersion in a particular culture” (227). Likewise, Calhoun defines cosmopolitanism as “focusing on the world as a whole rather than on a particular locality or group within it” and it shows “being at home with diversity” (428). Cosmopolitanism as a key concept can be explained by Fazal Rivzi “as a mode of learning about, and ethically engaging with, new cultural formations...culture and intercultural relations” (21).

Throughout his studies, Ulrich Beck Concluded that cosmopolitanism has “left the realm of philosophical castles in the air and has entered reality. Indeed it has become the defining feature of a new era, the era of reflexive modernity, in which national borders and differences are dissolving” (2).

It is clear that Brexit represents opposition to the implications that political elites spread over decades, concerning global ‘cosmopolitan Britain’ with an economic globalization and with some sort of multiculturalism. Cosmopolitanism is seen as a signal of threat to national

identity and therefore, its outcome was the rise of populism in the UK against cosmopolitan culture that is designed by a paradigm shift towards English nationalism. According to Craig Calhoun: “Brexit was a vote against London, globalization, and multiculturalism as much as a vote against Europe (57). He argued that Brexit came as a result of the discontent of the public over “Cool Britannia” (60). According to him:

Brexit was manifestly a vote against multiculturalism and for English nationalism. A large part of the British population felt as though their country was slipping away from them . . . [this] also reflected globalisation, immigration, international conflict and perhaps above all economic transformation. And the Brexit vote made clear that the cosmopolitan elites who shaped the new Britain failed to generate a new narrative, a new national self-understanding to make sense of the changes and membership in the transformed country (59, 60)

Immigration is considered as a threat that affects change in the cultural norms of a society. The contribution of media coverage on immigration and how the matter has been taken by political elites also play an important part on how it affects ideological attitudes towards immigration (Coutts 234).

Stephen Coutts argues that Union Citizenship has cosmopolitan characteristics (232). He asserts that “Cosmopolitan citizenship entails a particular normative ideal, founded on a principle of liberal equality amongst individuals operating at a global level” (239). Union citizenship and immigration were the two great significant issues that undergo discussions through the Brexit debate and had a response of ‘NO’, which was the culmination of years of turmoil, and that resulted in the Brexit opinion poll of June 2016.

4. Utilitarianism and Austerity

According to Cambridge Dictionary, Utilitarianism is defined as “the system of thought that states that the best action or decision in a particular situation is the one that brings most advantages to the most people” (“Utilitarianism”).

Matthew Loveless suggests that individuals assess European integration depending on social location variables. For example, those who benefit from EU membership are regarded as ‘winners’, whereas those of a small salary are considered as ‘losers’. (Loveless 1085). Individuals are classified according to the level of their income, cost benefit, cue taking, education...etc.

Goodwin and Heath concluded that:

the vote for Brexit was delivered by the ‘left behind’—social groups that are united by a general sense of insecurity, pessimism and marginalisation, who do not feel as though elites, whether in Brussels or Westminster, share their values, represent their interests and genuinely empathise with their intense angst about rapid social, economic and cultural change (331)

Brexit was a response to the dissatisfaction and frustration of the British population as a result of the economic transformation determined by globalization and liberal political economy. Social and cultural transformation was one of these figures of alienation and frustration to what has been the outcome the Leave vote option that reflects sense of disapproval to immigration and economic reasons (Coutts 234). Colantone and Stanig argues that attitudes towards immigration is registered in areas, where strongly affected by ‘the import shock’ of goods (1). They asserts that that the Leave vote is associated with anti-immigration sentiments in areas where level of immigration saw an increase of dynamic economies and young

generation (1). The Leave vote is registered in ‘left-behind’ areas of globalization, where they are affected by ‘trade shocks’ (3- 4), and this triggered Leave supporters to feel isolationism (207). Colantone and Stanig argues that ‘the impact of shock’ saw an increase in regions where strongly affected by fiscal austerity (12). They also argues that the Leave vote is associated with nationalist and isolationist syndrome (7).

Calhoun argues that Cosmopolitanism found its ideal position in urban cities, and thus it was welcomed by urbanism (64). Sara Hobolt studies of Brexit vote shows that British citizens who voted to leave were more influenced by anti-immigration sentiments, who represent the less-educated group. In contrast, the young voters, who benefited from EU integration, opted for remain, as they were generally well-educated and young graduates who reside in urban cities (1260).

Conclusion

This chapter revealed the main factors, which influenced the public opinion in the Brexit Vote. The first factor is British Euroscepticism. Euroscepticism shows that people who have skeptical attitudes towards the European membership turn to express anti-immigration sentiments and express less support to European integration. The second factor is national identity, which is featured by a strong national belonging. People who have strong national identity perceive the ‘other’ as a threat to their cultural identity and in return they are more likely to support leaving the European Union. On the other hand, those who feel European identity or have multiple identities feel less of the threat of the ‘other’ on their own cultural identity. The third factor is cosmopolitanism; it can be understood in a society where the construction of culture of the ‘other’ is opposed to that of nationalism and belonging. Brexit was a reaction against multiculturalism and diversity that threatens cultural heritages of British identity. The last factor is Utilitarianism; people assess European integration according the

benefits from European membership. Brexit was delivered by the left behind groups, or the old people, who felt themselves marginalized and losers of globalization. Whereas, those who felt themselves winners of globalization supported Remain in the EU, since they benefited from European integration.

The analysis of the political speeches that were delivered during the Brexit campaign in the third chapter will attempt to reveal the arguments that were used to convince the British people, by both the Leave and Remain campaigns. In addition to this, the chapter will also include the role of the media in influencing the public voting behaviour in the Brexit referendum.

Chapter III

Brexit Debate: Arguments on Sovereignty, Immigration and Economy

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Brexit Debate: Arguments on Sovereignty, Immigration and Economy

Introduction

The referendum campaign on EU membership arose two sides in diametric opposition promoting their standpoints to either leave or remain in the EU. Each of the Leave and Remain campaigns suggested vivid arguments on Britain's environment being a member in the European Union, and how the prospect consequences will affect the country if Brexit happen. The Brexit campaign outlined controversial arguments on basic conceptual issues of EU integration concerning national sovereignty, immigration and economy. This present chapter attempts to study the arguments and issues included in the Brexit campaign debate through the political speeches delivered by both Leave and Remain campaigns.

1. Nationalism, Sovereignty and Democracy

The issue of parliamentary sovereignty and transformation of power from the heart of Britain to a centralized EU government, which is stated in the passage of the European Communities Act 1972, arose in the Brexit debate. As we have already mentioned in the first chapter, in 2015, David Cameron reoccurred his firm pledge to hold a referendum on any further transfer of powers to the European Union and to take back control of the UK parliamentary sovereignty from the European court of justice. The European Union Act of 2011 provided the necessity to hold a referendum before any EU treaty willing to transfer powers from UK to Brussel. The referendum was decided to be held on the 23rd of June 2016. Before the Brexit referendum, Britain arose with two opponent sides, The Leave campaign who argues for leave and the Remain campaign who argues for Remain.

In his speech "*Nigel Farage at Grassroots out launch in Kettering*", on the 23rd of January, 2016, Nigel Farage spoke of the 'loss of sovereignty' and claims that "this transfer of

powers from our country, from our parliament, from our courts to these of the EU institutions is not what my mother and father voted for back in 1975". He adds the question of sovereignty to his arguments. For him, Britain should govern itself by its own laws and regulations, and not follow EU terms; to put it in his words "I believe we should make our own laws in our own country". Farage's views are shared by influential media figures like Ambrose Evans-Pritchard, International business editor of the *Daily Telegraph*. In his article "*Brexit vote is about the supremacy of Parliament and nothing else: Why I am voting to leave the EU*" Evans-Pritchard discussed the conceptual issue of parliamentary sovereignty as a matter of choice for British people's destiny either to restore their parliamentary "self-government" or continue to be governed by European "supranational regime" that the British people "do not elect in any meaningful sense" (Evans-Pritchard). In the same vein, Robin Niblett, the director of the Think Tank Chatham House, asserted that the British people must restore the UK parliamentary sovereignty, which is the core of Britain's "independent spirit" as a remote island from Europe (Ringeisen-Biardeaud 4). Micheal Gove, UK MP, who campaigned for Vote Leave, he argued in his statement "*Statement from Micheal Gove MP, Secretary of State for Justice, on the EU Referendum*" that only "people we choose" could decide on all "decisions which govern all our lives" and all orderly laws that "we must all obey".

Nigel Farage argues that Britain did not establish itself as a key role in European decision-making, he addressed the loss of sovereignty and lack of democracy in Britain when laws rests with the "unelected European Commission" that makes Britain has no choice but to obey, regardless to whether it was good or bad. Farage argues that: "There is nothing the British Government, there is nothing our 651 MPs, there is nothing all of you can do to change a single piece of the European legislation because the sole right to propose law and the sole right to repeal law rests with the unelected European commission" (Farage). He adds "You cannot be an independent self-governing nation and a member of this European Union". Farage confirms

“those who went before us and twice in the 20th century risked or sacrificed everything they had, they did it so that we could be a free independent democracy and I want back back”.

What is remarkably valuable about Nigel Farage’s speech is the use of repetition. Farage intends to repeat words “there is nothing” to make power of persuasion that Britain is weak inside the EU and emphasis on the negative consequences that resulted from Britain’s membership in the EU, and “back” to attract the audience attention to the importance of Britain’s withdrawal from the EU and restore its sovereignty.

In his Speech, Farage reveals his Eurosceptic attitude towards European integration. Affirming his position on European membership, Farage perceives nationalism in the uniqueness of Britain’s culture and identity and its difference from the European identity, he states: “I believe that the best people to govern Britain are the British people themselves”. For example, Farage in his speech determines the relationship between ‘self’ and ‘other’. He claims “They need us far more than we need them”. Therefore, Farage takes for granted ‘us’ as self-Britain or the in-group as opposed to ‘them’ as the ‘other’ Europe or the out-group as he takes for granted national ‘we’ against national ‘others’ ‘they’. The use of pronouns in Farage speech such as “we”, “our” and “us” are more likely to express nationalism and belonging. Farage believes that the other should have the features of Britishness to integrate in the British society when he suggests: “If immigration is to work, it has to be at a rate level whereby people speak the same language and can integrate”. It seems that Farage is more likely favourable to preserve the British cultural identity rather than creating cosmopolitan communities of different cultures.

In his speech, “*The Liberal Cosmopolitan Case to Vote Leave*”, Boris Johnson defends his stance on voting to leave the EU by discussing the loss of parliamentary sovereignty issue. He clearly acknowledges that EU is taking more control over Britain’s policymaking: “the EU is now generating 60 per cent of the laws passing through parliament”. He further argues that

the independence of Britain “is being seriously compromised” as he confirms “It is this fundamental democratic problem”.

Boris Johnson Eurosceptic reports on European projects continues when he tries to extract Europe’s constitutional flaws and convince the audience “to read the Lisbon Treaty - whose constitutional provisions were rejected by three EU populations, the French, the Dutch and the Irish” and to “see how far this thing has moved on from what we signed up for in 1972”.

In his Speech, “*Europe needs to change but...I am voting to stay*” Jeremy Corbyn admits that “it was the Labour Government that signed the Human Rights Act into UK law that transferred power from government - not to Brussels - but to individual citizens”.

On the other hand, David Cameron holds sovereignty has another signification as he believes in “the democratic liberation of an entire continent” and he argues that “The principal enshrined in the North Atlantic Treaty - that an attack on one is an attack on all - that remains the cornerstone of our national defence. That fundamental sharing of national sovereignty in order to deter potential aggressors.” Cameron prioritizes defence and security in the whole continent as one national interest of Europe than “the theory of sovereignty”. He adds that Britain acquired its fundamental strength and power in decision making after it had joined the EU; he asserts that “in the years since we joined the EU, we have shown that time and again with British, national, sovereign decisions about our foreign and defence policy taken by British prime ministers and British ministers”.

The Brexit referendum results showcased a majority who identified themselves as British opted for Remain, whereas those who identified themselves as English strongly backed Brexit. Not surprisingly, elderly people identified more with being English rather than British, the study showed that 44 per cent of over 65 years old associated themselves with being English compared to only 21 per cent of under 26 years old see themselves as English, and tended to

the same Leave vote option (Whiteley and Clarke). In another study by Lord Ashcroft concludes that in England, those who identified themselves as “English not British” or “more English than British” voted Leave, whereas in Scotland, those who see themselves as “Scottish not British”, or “more Scottish than British” voted Remain (Ashcroft).

It is clear that a majority of British people, especially England, responded with a more English national identity in the vote for Brexit. Fintan O’Toole, in an article written for the *The Guardian* entitled “*Brexit is being driven by English nationalism. And it will end in self-rule*” asserted that:

It is a question of the English used to ask about their subject peoples: are they ready for self-government? But it is now one that has to be asked about the English themselves. It’s not facetious: England seems to be stumbling towards a national independence it has scarcely even discussed, let alone prepared for. It is on the brink of one of history’s strangest nationalist revolutions. When you strip away the rhetoric, Brexit is an English nationalist movement. (O’Toole)

Immigration has brought multi-culturalism into Britain’s society. Robert Booth wrote in *The Guardian* in his article “*Four in 10 think British culture is undermined by multiculturalism,*” suggested that “A large minority in the UK believe multiculturalism has undermine British culture and that migrants do not properly integrate”.

2. Immigration

2.1. Take Back Control

‘Take Back Control’ is the Vote Leave campaign slogan that warned voters about the existing of uncontrolled EU migration and how free movement of people will affect living standards. Micheal Gove argues in his statement that “European Union regulation has entrenched mass unemployment”. The Office for National Statistics (ONS) showed that

333.000 migrants including non-EU nationals existed in the UK in 2015 (Cooper). This issue attracted the Leave campaign and they saw that these immigrants have strong negative impact on employment over the existing workers in Britain. Iain Duncan, Former Work and Pensions Secretary, asserts that because of an increase level of EU immigration in Britain, Britons are “forced to compete” with guest workers coming from Europe for employment (Cooper). For this reason, pessimism over European integration continued when Boris Johnson warned about the risk of a continued membership in the European Union as shown in the following quote:

it is deeply corrosive of popular trust in democracy that every year UK politicians tell the public that they can cut immigration to the tens of thousands - and then find that they miss their targets by hundreds of thousands, so that we add a population the size of Newcastle every year, with all extra and unfunded pressure that puts on the NHS and other public services (Johnson)

Boris Johnson discussed political trust, which is broken by the UK politician’s fake promises and unloyalty to the UK citizens. Johnson argues that the European extra migrants due to the uncontrolled migration puts the NHS services at stake due to the young generation of students “who want to pay to come to our universities”. He continues to argue that “we find ourselves hard pressed to recruit people who might work in our NHS, as opposed to make use of its services- because we have absolutely no power control the numbers who are coming with no jobs offers and no qualifications from 28 EU countries”. Boris Johnson finds it difficult to recruit British employee because of uncontrolled number of immigration who come to Britain and inappropriate to marginalize the British employee and replace them by the immigrant one.

“The Liberal Cosmopolitan Case to Vote Leave” reveals distrust of European institutions when Boris Johnson informed people about the weakness of the European Union. He says “Europe faces twin crises of mass migration, and a euro that has proved a disaster for

some member states; and the grim truth is that the risks of staying in this unreformed EU are intensifying and not diminishing”.

Similarly, Farage asserts that “the levels of immigration are too high”. Farage believes that the mass uncontrolled migration to Britain stimulates concerns over the safety of wages and services when he says “we know net migration is running at third of a million a year”. As a result, from its effects, “driven down the wages for ordinary workers in Britain” and put pressure on “primary school places ... the health service all of our vital public services”. Farage reasoned that uncontrolled immigration has negative effects in such a way that “is to change many communities in our market towns and even our cities in a way that is unrecognizable”. It looks like Farage warned about establishing a cosmopolitan community that characterizes of many communities of different cultures. He adds that only after leaving the EU that the UK would be able to control its borders and immigration, and therefore “put in place an Australian style point system, so we can decide who comes to Britain”.

Concerning security, in recent years, arising discussions over the issue of terrorism vis-a-vis immigration appeared in the political discourse. Far-reaching prudent and extreme caution have been arisen over transitional terrorism that operates with ‘infiltrates migration flows’ (Bove et al 3). The Leave campaign concluded restrictions on immigration. Increasingly departing from positive aspects of EU, the rise of Euroscepticism as a result of free movement of people and abolition of the border, which stimulate concerns about security that may stem from terrorism. Such terrorist incidents experienced in UK in recent years was Westminster Bridge, London Bridge that resulted thirty-six people deal, and Manchester Arena (1).

In his Speech, Boris Johnson raises security concerns that are likely to affect citizen’s lives and everyday life stability and peace. Boris Johnson believes that: “It is very worrying that the European Court of Justice - Luxembourg, not Strasbourg - should now be freely

adjudicating on human rights questions, and whether or not this country has the right to deport people the Home Office believes are threat to our security”. Likewise, Farage suggests “the best way to ensure ourselves against future terrorism is to take back control of our borders”.

2.2. Britain Stronger in Europe

The Remain campaign used the argument that the EU migration brought the benefits for both UK and its citizens. Jeremy Corbyn’s pro-European stance drove him “for staying in” since he believes that the EU “has brought: investment, jobs and protection for workers, consumers and environment” (Corbyn). Corbyn Believes that what happens because of international conflict concerns British people as part of European Union that is “as a continent and as a global community” such as “climate change”, which requires “global corporations” and most of all “to tackle cyber-crime and terrorism”. Corbyn believes in globalisation when he suggests “How to ensure we trade fairly and protect jobs and pay in an era of globalisation”.

Jeremy Corbyn argues that the Conservative government has long been dealing with wrong system, which “weakened” Britain. He goes to underestimate the existing jobs, which were created under the UK’s government and some bad accomplishments could be seen in a “low skill, low pay and insecure jobs”. Corbyn believes that UK government brought “failure “to train enough skilled workers”. On the ground of this, he argues that Britain became “reliant on migration to keep its economy functioning”. He argues that if Britain “harnessed Europe’s potential” Britain “could be far more to defend high skill jobs in the steel industry”.

Corbyn’ stance on “globalized world” is positive and centered upon the beliefs that “many of us will study, work or even retire abroad at some point in our lives”. Thus, in return since Britain is open to immigration, and benefit from their skills “brings benefits as well as challenges at home”.

The CEO of National Health and Services in England suggested that 130.000 of EU-born doctors and nurses are needed for the safety and health care of British citizens. Moreover, EU migrants represents 78 per cent of UK workers and therefore, by paying their taxes, they offer the NHS the opportunity to extend more of its services regarding to the young EU generation, who contribute to the help of NHS as well. Simon Stevens also argued that UK needs the young immigrants to pay taxes so that to provide social welfare the older generation (Cooper). In this light, Corbyn suggests that Britain's experience throughout the years of free movement of people and immigration to the UK can justify the fact that globalization offered the advantages to Britain that resulted in the benefits of Britain's NHS "which depends on migrant nurses and doctors", he argues:

This is especially true of our NHS which depends on migrant nurses and doctors to fill vacancies. This Government has failed to invest in training, and its abolition of nurses' bursaries, and its decision to pick a fight with junior doctors is likely to make those shortages worse
(Corbyn)

At the end of his speech, Jeremy Corbyn shifts his views to the future, as his focus turned more on the younger generation who "will live longest with the consequences". Corbyn argues that Britain's ideal position is with the world as he goes to advice the young people for a "better world" if their stance turned to be "with the world".

Similarly, David Cameron believes that Britain's place in the world should be engaged with international system of nations to keep Britain "strong in the world" as he suggests "our membership of the EU is one of the tools - one of the tools - that helps us to do these things, like our membership of other international bodies such as NATO or the UN Security Council." (Cameron). He also believes that remaining in the EU provide Britain security and keep the

British “people safe” throughout the European nations collaborations to fight such terrorist networks and to detect illegal migrants, he argues:

Security today is not only a matter of hard defence, of stopping tanks – it is also about rooting out terrorist networks, just as it is about detecting illegal immigrants, stopping human trafficking and organized crime. And that makes much closer security cooperation between our European nations essential (Cameron)

Considering the immigration issue, 65 per cent of those who support ‘Leave’ think that leaving the EU will ensure the country’s ability to control immigration; in contrast, 56 per cent who support ‘Remain’ think that this would not be achieved by Brexit (“Debates about economy and immigration”).

3. Economy

3.1. The Leave Campaign

Boris Johnson started his speech by expressing his “skeptical” attitudes, due to “the anti-democratic absurdities of the EU”. He argues that Bloomberg speech made Britain “excited in 2013” but British people frustration overwhelmed them afterwards since “no reform was forthcoming”. Boris Johnson used figures of speech such as ‘simile’ to spring interest and arisen imagination while he criticizes the European affairs in its economic management. He says: “the truth is it is not we who have changed. It is the EU that has changed out all recognition; and to keep insisting that the EU is about economics is like saying the Italian Mafia is interested in olive oil and real estate”. Boris Johnson compares European affairs on economics to illegal actions such as those of the ‘Mafia’. His discourse appears skeptical and polemic to Europe as he went to express severe disapproval of the process of European integration since the early days of Britain’s membership in the EU when he argues:

It is true, but profoundly uninformative about the real aims of that organization. What was once the EEC has undergone a spectacular metamorphosis in the last 30 years, and the crucial point is that it is still becoming ever more centralizing, interfering and anti-democratic (Johnson)

Boris Johnson's Eurosceptic narratives about European Economic turmoil emerged when Johnson reveals the loss of "democratic control" over trade regulations between the UK and EU when he argues that "The most important mistake is to think that there is some effective and sensible trade-off between the loss of democratic control and greater economic prosperity". Johnson exposed the fact that the loss of democratic control is "spiritually damaging, and socially risky".

Through reading Boris Johnson's speech, we can understand his Eurosceptic attitudes while expressing disapproval to European affairs on money spending on EU budget. As a matter of fact, he confirms that "People are surprised and alarmed to discover that our gross contributions to the EU budget are now running at about £20bn, and that the net contribution is £10bn; and it is not just that we have no control over how that money is spent".

The use of pejorative words such as 'fraud' by Boris Johnson in his speech is to describe financial management of EU, which he saw it as 'fraud' as he openly argues that "EU spending is persistently associated with fraud". However, the political dispute with the Remain campaign over Europe came into sight when Johnson denounces such acts, which are dismissed by the Remain campaign as a mere "bagatelle" but instead should have rather been used for good business such as spend money in building "new British hospital". It was an attack argument against the Remain campaign to highlight their flaws in their arguments on European Union integration and its policies, and therefore able to drive trust to the Leave campaign so that to vote Leave in Brexit referendum.

In the “*The Liberal Cosmopolitan Case to Vote Leave*” speech, Boris Johnson repeats words such as “not” and “nothing”. These words appear when Johnson’s Eurosceptic attitude to the EU notified the British people about the European static affairs while “there has been not a single change to EU competences, not a single change to the Treaty”. In addition to this, he adds that “nothing on agriculture, nothing on the role of the court, nothing of any substance on borders – nothing remotely resembling the agenda for change that was promised in the 2013 Bloomberg speech”. Additionally, he says “We have got to stop trying to kid the British people; we have got to stop saying one thing in Brussels . . . We have got to stop the systematic campaign of subterfuge”. It is clearly reasonable to state that Boris Johnson intentionally uses repetition as a rhetorical device in his political speech to make power of persuasion and attract public attention to focus on Europe’s policy flaws so that to bring more voters to vote ‘Leave’.

Nigel Farage believes that if Britain leaves the European Union, it “will be better off economically”, and therefore Britain can make its “own trade deals” instead of “squandering over 50 million pounds a day as a contribution”. Farage gives an alternative contribution instead of money spending on EU constitution; He argues that Britain outside the European Union “could build a new district hospital every week in this country for the cost of our EU contributions”.

The leave campaign argues that Britain would be able to save £350 million each week from the money that was given to EU; it will be in charge of its own borders, control them within their own laws; control immigration; establish free trade deals with the whole world (“Why Vote Leave”). Studies shows that EU mismanagement left Britain lost over 125 billion in its economy. Freed from the EU would give the UK exemption privileges from the Single Market rules and therefore, the pursuit of achieving national interest resorts to new cooperation with the United states , Russia and China. Besides, Britain would save £20 million a day in the

subsequent halt of money spending in taxes payments to EU budget (“Arguments for and against Britain”).

3.2. The Remain Campaign

On the Contrary, the Remain campaign provided countable arguments about ‘Britain Strong in Europe’. For instance, remaining in the EU provides ‘economic security, peace and stability’ in Britain (“Why the Government”). Jeremy Corbyn proves that Britain “cannot built a better world” unless British people “engage with the world” in addition to this “build allies and deliver change”. Corbyn believes that “The European Union – 28 countries and 520 million people - could have made us stronger, by defending our steel industries together” (Corbyn).

Studies shows that the UK and EU have strong trade cooperation during the past decades. Since Britain’s membership in the EU, the UK benefits from 44 per cent of its goods exports to the EU. The EU’s economy is quintuple larger than UK’s with over 500 million Customers, Therefore, being a member in the EU gives the opportunity to invest in the UK, and that over £540 billion had been invested in the UK in the last decade. In addition, over 3 million of jobs were offered due to UK exports to the EU. Nevertheless, leaving the EU would congeal the full access to EU’s Single Market, disturb commercial exchange facilities between UK and EU, and provoke higher prices on goods and services (“Why the Government”).

In his speech, David Cameron asserts that Britain as “part of a single market of 500 million people which Britain helped to create. Our goods and, crucially, our services - which account for almost 80% of our economy - can trade freely by right” he confirms why Britain “have created almost 2.4 million jobs over the last 6 years”. In this light, Treasury argues that Britain would cost £4,300 a year to every household by 2030 if Britain leaves the EU (“HM Treasury”).

NatCen Social Research studies shows that, 73 per cent supporters of ‘Remain’ believed that a continued membership in the EU would damage the UK’s economy, whereas, 59 percent of ‘Vote Leave’ supporters think that exiting the EU will promote the economy of the country (“Debates about economy and immigration”).

4. Media Bias

Media’s role has grown dramatically over the years, and its impact cannot be denied nowadays. Indeed, it is the most important tool in informing, and directing the mass population’s opinion and perspective on crucial affairs. Media is one, if not the most, influential weapon in our age.

British media as anticipated helped in affecting and shaping people’s opinions about Brexit, before, during and after the referendum. As many other sectors during that time, it was divided into a category that supported remaining within the EU and a Eurosceptic category that supported leaving the European Union. Loads of readers got their information, facts and arguments from mass media like TV, radio, and newspapers. These latter helped them shape an ideology (left or right wing) and decide on which camp to support.

Many of the British newspapers claimed to choose which side they were on, and that was no surprise as they were known for having a strong party-political position. *Daily Mail*, *Daily Mirror*, *The Sun* and *The Daily Telegraph* supported Leave, whereas *The Times*, *The Guardian* and *The Financial Times* backed Remain (Ridley). According to the Huffington post the newspapers, which supported leave had more audiences than the ones that supported Remain; it is estimated that 4.8 million people read the Leave newspapers compared to only three million from the remain side (Ridley). *The BBC*, on the other hand, is depicted to be “neutral”, although it has undergone accusations from both camps to be biased (Greenslade). In its turn, social media played its role especially through platforms like Twitter in conveying

people's opinions. The Reuters Institute for the Study of Journalism conducted a study on the articles published by nine British newspapers during the period of the referendum campaign, which were: *the Daily Mirror, Daily Mail, Daily Express, Financial Times, Daily Telegraph, Daily Star, The Times, The Sun, and The Guardian*. The results of this study reveal that among 2,378 of their articles 41% of them were pro-leave, whereas only 27% were pro-remain. (Levy, Billur, and Bironzo). In addition to campaign representatives, 74% of pro Leave campaigners quoted in articles, whereas only 26% of Pro Remain campaigners (Levy, Billur, and Bironzo).

Euroscepticism can be found in Eurosceptic newspapers such as *The Sun*, which had a boost of circulation of nearly 1.8 million; it is considered one of the most circulated and influential in the country. In a newspaper entitled "*We Urge Our Readers to BeLEAVE in Britain and Vote to Quit the EU on June 23.*" The Sun expressed skepticism to a continued membership in the European Union. The newspaper strongly supported the Leave campaign back in 2016; their posts urged readers to "vote to quit the EU" and "free ourselves from dictatorial Brussels". It states "We must set ourselves free from dictatorial Brussels." *The Sun* claims that Britain's membership of the EU was not a good bargain for Britain, *The Sun* argues:

Throughout our 43 year membership of the European Union it has proved increasingly incompetent in a crisis ... Outside the EU we can become richer, safer and free at long last to forge our own destiny – as America, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and many other great democracies already do ("We Urge Our Readers to BeLEAVE")

While speaking to the *Daily Mail* newspaper entitled "*White Britons Could Be in the Minority by 2060's Claims Oxford Professor DAVID COLEMAN*", Former Oxford professor of demography, David Coleman, warned about the risk of decrease in the number of population growth of the white English speaker to become a minority in Britain by 2060s. He argues that "Rapid Population growth, driven by the highest immigration in our history, is destabilising

and transforming its population, its environment and its ethnic make-up into something quite new” (Coleman). His conclusion of his study over immigration control issue in Britain is that if immigration is not diminished and not controlled “the country will be transformed out of recognition by the consequences of a very large population”, and therefore “the White British population would cease to be the majority in the UK by the late 2060s” (Coleman).

On the other hand, pro remain newspaper such as The Guardian, which is entitled “*EU referendum: Brexit bad for UK, Europe and the world, warns OECD*”, The Guardian supported Remain in the EU. Catherine Mann, the chief economist at the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and development, asserts that, “A vote against remaining in the EU would be bad for the UK, bad for Europe and bad for the global economy” (Elliot). She continues arguing that 40% of the UK’s trade goes to Europe. It will be faced with tariffs. Trade will be more costly. Divorce would take two years, and that’s long time for there to be uncertainty” (Elliot).

Analysis of the data provided above lead us to conclude that the biased views of the media, through promoting the Leave campaign, helped to shape voter’s opinions and reinforced their sense of belonging. At the end, the Leave campaign won, as voters apparently were convinced by what was promoted and voted for Britain to leave the EU.

Conclusion

Each of the Leave and Remain campaign narratives provides insights about sovereignty, immigration and economy. The Leave campaign argued that the loss of sovereignty stemmed from the transformation of power that from UK parliament to Brussel. Boris Johnson, and Nigel Farage proclaimed the loss of sovereignty, the loss of democratic control over trade regulations, and the loss of control over the national border, which resulted uncontrolled immigration that threatened wages, jobs and services as well as to security. In addition to this, the economic turmoil of Britain because of the European integration. On the

other hand, David Cameron and Jeremy Corbyn provided vivid arguments about globalization as Britain needs to be with Europe and with the world so that Britain can benefit from well skilled migrants, better security, and economic stability.

Media was dubbed to be biased as it often spread articles supporting the Eurosceptic views of the Leave campaign, such as *The Sun*, and *Daily Mail*, and other newspapers such as *The Guardian* and *The Times* reported headlines encouraging remain in the European Union.

General Conclusion

General Conclusion

The first chapter provided a historical background of the United Kingdom's relationship with the European Union. We explained Britain's turmoil relationship with the European Union that dates back to Britain's early days of its integration in the EU in 1973. Britain's Euroscepticism appeared because of the European projects of socialism that does not fulfill Britain's national interest. In fact, Britain's membership into the European Union aimed only to create intergovernmental relations between UK and EU. This skepticism appeared especially when Margaret Thatcher turned to be skeptical to the president of the European commission Jacques Delors, who wished Europe embrace socialism. This Euroscepticism grew especially as a reaction to the Maastricht Treaty, which created European Union. The latter, introduced the Euro as a single currency and established free movement of people. This led to the emergence of Eurosceptic groups such as the right wing of the Conservative Party and hard Euroscepticism, UKIP in 1993, which aimed to put Britain outside the European Union because UKIP was in opposition to join social Europe.

Tony Blair, who is pro-European, wished to create intergovernmental relations with Europe and tried to reform policies that the Conservative government under John Major had created. One of Blair's aims was to put Britain in the leading position within the European Union. Blair's contribution to the creation of European Defense of Security Policy aimed to create peacekeeping forces to create stability where the war actually exists. However, Blair couldn't resist in the leading position because of foreign interventions. Gordon Brown succeeded Tony Blair as prime minister in 2007; however, his era knew a series of economic turmoil like the economic recession in 2008 that made the UK economy in distress. The Conservative Party under the Leadership of David Cameron came to power in 2010. Cameron contributed to create the coalition government with Nick Clegg, leader of Liberal Democrat. Cameron tried to sustain the enduring issue of the split in the Conservative Party between pro-

European Europhiles and Eurosceptics concerning European integration. In addition, the UKIP became popular party, and started to manifest mainstream Conservative Party in the marginal seats. Cameron promised to hold an in/out referendum if his Conservative Party won the general election of 2015 and he was confident that his country would stay in the EU; yet, his expectations turned against him when the UK opted to leave the European Union.

Before the Brexit vote, two main campaigns arose in contradictory arguments, which are the Leave and Remain campaigns. The Leave campaign consisted of Vote Leave campaign, under its slogan 'Take Back Control', Leave. EU, and Grassroots out, which gained support from UKIP leader Nigel Farage. On the other hand, the Remain campaign consisted of 'Britain Stronger in Europe'. Each of Leave and Remain campaigns introduced main issues such as sovereignty, immigration and economy. The Leave campaign argued that by leaving the EU, Britain would take back control of its sovereignty, of its own border and make new cooperation trade agreement with the world. On the contrary, the Remain campaign argued that staying in a reformed EU would promote Britain's economy, and offer better security, better cooperating trade within the single market as well as sovereignty control within the whole continent of Europe. However, the results turned as a shock for both UK and EU as Britain opted to leave the European Union in 23 June 2016.

The 2016 referendum results showed that a majority of leave voters registered in England and Wales, whereas Scotland and Northern Ireland voted to stay in the EU. The outcome of the Brexit referendum would rise the question of whether Brexit is delivered by English nationalism.

In the second Chapter, we discussed how British Euroscepticism as opposed to the European integration revealed that people who conceived about their national identity as a big value perceive the threat of the other culture are ranked higher to be considered as Eurosceptic

individuals; and resultantly, expresses less support to the European integration. National identity was one of the main factors that determined the voting behaviour in the Brexit referendum. As a matter of fact, strong national identity is associated with Leave, whereas individuals who feel European identity and those who consider the threat of the 'other' identity on their own cultural identity as not big value backed Remain in the Brexit referendum. Cosmopolitanism was one of the key issues, in which the vote for Brexit was a response against globalization and multiculturalism. Utilitarianism seeks to focus on actions that bring the most benefits to people. People who benefited from the European integration, who represent the youth generation, expressed positive support to EU integration as they are considered as winners of 'globalization'. On the contrary, people who felt as marginalized are the ones who are felt themselves as 'the left behind', or losers of globalization, who represent the old generation and they are more likely to support Brexit.

In the third chapter, we exposed the main issues delivered by the Leave and Remain campaign, which are sovereignty, immigration, and economy. In fact, Brexit campaign narratives spread arguments on Britain's membership in the European Union. Leave campaign speeches such as "*The Liberal Cosmopolitan Case to Vote Leave*" in which Boris Johnson reveals skeptical attitude over the loss of sovereignty, loss of control over national border, as he goes to spread pessimism over the European affairs such as bad management of money spending to EU Budget. Similarly, Nigel Farage's speech "*Nigel Farage MEP at Grassroots Out launch in Kettering*" where he argues that the transformation of sovereignty from Britain to Europe stimulates concerns on Britain's economy, and on national border control as the EU weekend Britain to control its border. Many concerns would be addressed like change in communities market due to immigration and put total pressure on wages and services. On the other hand, the Remain campaign speeches such as "*Europe needs to change ...but I am voting to stay*", Corbyn advocated for staying in European Union and embrace globalisation.

Similarly, David Cameron in his speech “*PM speech on the UK’s strength and security in the EU*” recommended voting Remain in the European Union since Europe is the best place for security, for strong economy and brings benefits to the whole continent of Europe.

The media, in its turn during the referendum campaign, proved to be a very powerful tool in influencing voting behaviour and determining the vote choice in the Brexit referendum. It was divided into two categories: the Eurosceptic newspapers such as *the Sun* and *Daily Mail* advocates for Brexit and supported ‘Leave’; and the pro-remain newspapers such *The Guardian* and *The Times* supported ‘Remain’.

From our study of Brexit referendum campaign and our analysis of the speeches, we conclude that national identity and utilitarianism are the most powerful factors that influenced Britain’s public voting behaviour. The ones who voted for remain in the EU are the ones who are well educated and more satisfied with their income and are much likely to feel like they are the ‘winners’ of globalisation and feel less threat of the other culture on their own cultural identity. On the contrary, those who opted for leave are the ones who are more likely to feel ‘losers of globalization’, also called ‘left behind’ voters, or old people, those with lower income and they are less educated. Moreover, the old generation are more likely to express anti-immigration sentiments, and they consider the threat of European identity and the ‘Other’ cultural identity on their national identity. We have also argued that Brexit is delivered by those who feel strong national identity, especially English national identity, and who share weak European culture. Moreover, Brexit was a response against multiculturalism and globalization.

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Résumé

La présente thèse, intitulée *“Brexit Referendum Campaign and its Impact on the Public Voting Behaviour”*, explore les concepts d’Euroscépticisme, de nationalisme, de cosmopolitisme et d’utilitarisme dans les discours de la campagne du Brexit. Ces facteurs ont en effet déterminé le choix du vote lors du référendum sur le Brexit par rapport à l’intégration Européenne. Les arguments des élites de la campagne du Brexit ainsi que la couverture médiatique du Royaume-Uni sur les affaires et la politique de l’Union Européenne ont joué un rôle important dans le choix du vote des électeurs lors du référendum sur le Brexit. La campagne du Leave a livré des récits Euroscéptiques sur l’intégration Européenne, comme on peut le voir dans le discours de Boris Johnson intitulé *“The Liberal Cosmopolitan Case to Vote Leave”* et dans le discours de Nigel Farage intitulé *“Nigel Farage MEP at Grassroots out launch in Kettering”*. Dans ces discours, Johnson et Farage, se sont concentrés sur des questions prédatrices telles que la perte de la souveraineté de la Grande-Bretagne, la menace de l’immigration sur les salaires, les services, et sur la sécurité. Ils ont également souligné l’impact de l’intégration Européenne et l’impact de Brexit sur l’économie Britannique. Par contre, les discours de la campagne du Remain, tels que le discours de David Cameron *“PM speech on the UK’s strength and security in the EU”* et le discours de Jeremy Corbyn *“Europe needs to change but...I am voting to stay”* penchait davantage en faveur de la mondialisation et du maintien dans l’Union Européenne. Notre recherche examine également les questions abordées par les élites politiques des deux campagnes du Leave et du Remain dans leurs discours. Pour cette raison, nous nous appuyons sur la méthode expositive pour expliquer le choix du vote lors du référendum sur le Brexit en identifiant et en expliquant les concepts et les facteurs qui sont susceptibles d’influencer et de déterminer le comportement de vote du public Britannique.