Suez’s Crisis in 1956 A revealing of French geostrategic errors in the Eastern Mediterranean

Abstract

When France send a military force at Suez in 1956, the objective was to reopen the canal, shoot down Nasser and stop the support provided to the Algerian FLN. But French army is not prepared for this operation, the most important since the Second World War. It has project a mechanized army corps 3,000 kilometers from the metropolis. But it does not have the adequate tools to achieve this objective: no forward base in the Eastern Mediterranean, no rapid intervention force, no logistical doctrine for a specific external operation, warships in poor condition. The French army creates from scratch an expeditionary force and an attack plan, a true copy of Operation Overlord in Normandy en 1944. But under international pressure and the nuclear threat, the French, without having achieved their objectives, are forced to accept a ceasefire that they didn’t prepared or anticipated. The Suez campaign, usually considered a military victory, is in reality a doctrinal impasse for France. It is rushing into it without the necessary flexibility due to the lack of logistical capabilities to quickly project such a large force.

Keywords: Suez, military Support, military Operation, Mediterranean, cold War, military bases