Krim Belkacem’s attak on the caïd Demoune, Draa el-Mizan, 1947: Autopsy of a revolutionary action

Abstract

On December 25, 1947, the mixed commune of Draa El-Mizane was the site of an attack targeting the vehicle of Caïd Dehmoune, who was accompanied by the rural guard Mahmoudi. The car was riddled with bullets, and both men were seriously wounded. Mahmoudi died a few hours after the attack. The individual suspected of orchestrating the assault was Krim Belkacem, a local leader of the PPA, who had convened representatives of the douar and formed an armed group to ambush and eliminate the caïd. This episode raises critical questions: how did Krim Belkacem manage to mobilize the inhabitants of the douar to carry out such a sentence?

Documents produced by the colonial administration, its police, and the colonial press focused exclusively on the attack, portraying the guerrillas as mere criminals and labeling their actions as terrorism and banditry. They ignored the brutal reprisals carried out by law enforcement and their auxiliaries, which led to the arrest of numerous individuals, many of whom were sentenced to severe punishments, including the death penalty.

Following the attack, the entire region of Draa El-Mizan was subjected to harsh repression, aimed at coercing the population into cooperating with the security forces in identifying and capturing the perpetrators. Numerous arrests and convictions ensued. Although Krim Belkacem and some of his companions managed to evade arrest, they were relentlessly pursued and forced to live as fugitives.

This study examines Krim Belkacem's armed engagement prior to the revolution and the impact of his actions on the local population. It is divided into three main parts: first, a detailed account of the attack; second, an analysis of its motivations, including an examination of explanations offered by colonial sources; and third, an exploration of the consequences of the repression for the inhabitants of the Draa El-Mizan region.

Our findings suggest that for nationalist reasons—specifically in response to the abuses committed by Caïd Dehmoune—Krim Belkacem initiated and organized the attack, mobilizing the local population and selecting the participants. Administrative and police records, along with the colonial press in Algeria, distorted the events. Although the attack was politically motivated—driven by the PPA nationalists’ refusal to tolerate the caïd’s and his rural guard’s mistreatment of an already oppressed population—colonial sources depicted it as a social conflict rooted in traditional rivalries and soff competition. While such rivalries may have played a role in the past, their significance had diminished with the rise of the nationalist movement opposing colonial rule and its local representatives in Kabyle villages. In retaliation, colonial security forces formed a militia and, relying on informants, launched a ferocious crackdown on the population that had sheltered and supported the so-called “outlaws.”